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SEC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONTINGENT ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
Gerard A. Caron* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes disclo-
sure obligations on all publicly held companies regarding their con-
tingent liability arising under federal, state, and local environmental 
control laws. 1 These obligations emerge out of specific SEC rules, 2 
as well as general materiality principles3 under the Securities Act of 
19334 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5 Violations of these 
disclosure requirements may result in civil or criminal liability under 
the federal securities laws. 6 The SEC may bring enforcement actions 
in appropriate cases, 7 and these proceedings may be supplemented 
* Executive Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. The author would like to thank Professor James Repetti for his helpful comments and 
guidance. 
1 Hamilton, Environmental Disclosure Requirements of the Securities & Exchange Com· 
mission,in THE MCGRAW HILL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING HANDBOOK :?r-l09 (L. Harrison 
ed. 1984). 
The disclosure requirements under discussion apply not only to the ongoing reports of 
publicly held companies (publicly held companies include companies that have greater than $5 
million in assets and at least 500 shareholders, companies that engaged in a public offering 
under the Securities Act of 1933 and have at least 300 shareholders, and companies that have 
securities listed on a national securities exchange) filed under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, but also apply where a company files a registration statement pursuant to section 5 of 
the Securities Act of 1933. The specific rules and the general materiality principles discussed 
herein apply in both instances. 
2 See Item 103 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
3 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982); see also infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982). 
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). 
6 Hamilton, supra note 1, at :?r-l09. 
7 Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6130, (LEXIS, Fedsec library, 
Secrel file) (Sept. 27, 1979). See, e.g., In the Matter of Occidental Petroleum Corp., Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,950, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,622 (July 2, 
1980). 
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by private civil actions by aggrieved members of the investing pub-
lic.8 
The environmental disclosure requirements are of particular im-
portance because the potential for corporate liability based on en-
vironmental damage is substantial. 9 For example, criminal and civil 
liability may result from corporate violations of the following legis-
lative pronouncements: the Clean Air Act,lO the Clean Water Act, 11 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,12 the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,13 
and the Toxic Substances Control Act. 14 Not only are the dollar 
amounts that corporations must pay for violating these statutes high 
in comparison with non-environmental civil penalty provisions, 15 but 
these costs may also escalate if corporations do not discover or 
correct violations in a timely manner.16 Furthermore, although the 
political climate in this country has changed since federal and state 
legislatures enacted the bulk of environmental legislation, 17 it is not 
likely that there will be any major changes in the structure of pol-
lution control law. 18 
8 Notice of Commission Conclusions, Securities Act Release No. 5704, [1975-1976 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,495 at 86,298 (May 6, 1976). See, e.g., Grossman v. 
Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
9 Price and Danzig, Environmental Auditing: Developing a "Preventive Medicine" Ap-
proach to Environmental Compliance, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1986). 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
11 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
1242 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 3923 (1986). 
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982). 
15 Selmi, Enforcing Environmental Laws: A Look at the State Civil Penalty Statute, 19 
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1279, 1285-86 (1986). Selmi explains: 
[d. 
A 1979 study of the 348 federal civil penalty statutes then extant found that only 
thirty-five set dollar limits of $10,000 or more per violation, while twelve imposed 
limits of $25,000 or more. Nine of these twelve statutes were environmental in nature 
.... To the extent that penalty amounts indicate the priority Congress attaches to 
regulatory mandates, environmental requirements are important. 
16 [d. at 1287. As the author points out, "when a penalty accrues at a rate of $5,000 to 
$25,000 per violation, with each day that the violator transgresses the regulatory standard 
deemed a separate violation, the possible penalty can rapidly mUltiply if the violation is not 
quickly discovered or promptly corrected." [d. 
17 Reed, The Supreme Court and Environmental Law: A Whole New Ballgame?, 14 ENVTL. 
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10262 (1984). 
18 Novick, The Twenty-Year Evolution of Pollution Law: A Look Back, 4 ENVTL. FORUM 
12 (1986). Novick comments: 
Pollution control law, in short, is a largely complicated structure .... [T]he structure 
is so big and complex, and it embraces so much of national life, that big changes 
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This Comment examines the history and current status of SEC 
disclosure requirements regarding corporate contingent liability for 
environmental damage. The first section discusses the development 
of these requirements in the 1970's and early 1980's, especially as 
this development reveals the intent of its framers. The second sec-
tion then explains the existing requirements in the area of environ-
mental litigation disclosure by looking at relevant SEC releases and 
enforcement proceedings. The final section focuses on current dis-
closure obligations as they relate to un asserted claims for corporate 
environmental damage. This Comment ultimately explores and pro-
poses remedies for the two-fold problem that arises regarding dis-
closure of unasserted claims: the ambiguous standard used to deter-
mine materiality in this area, and the unreality of expecting a 
corporation to "turn itself in," with respect to its environmental 
misconduct that has thus far been undiscovered by parties outside 
the company. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEC ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS 
The central goal of the federal securities laws is to ensure that 
buyers and sellers of securities will be adequately informed of ma-
terial information affecting the value of the securities traded. 19 The 
general materiality standard applicable under these laws limits dis-
closable information to "those matters to which there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in 
determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered."20 Cor-
porations must report information that satisfies this standard in 
various public filings, including quarterly and annual reports filed 
with the SEC.21 
would be disruptive, and would require a major political effort for which no support 
appears likely, after the brief effort at change early in the Reagan Administration. 
Id. The implication is that the present body of environmental laws (including its relatively 
tough civil penalty provisions) is in place for a while. 
19 See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,858 (2d 
Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom, Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
20 17 C.F.R. § 240. 12b-2 (1986). See also TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976) (materiality requires "a showing of a substantial likelihood that ... the omitted 
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder"). 
21 Section 11 of the Securities Exchange Act requires every issuer that has securities 
registered under section 12 to file periodic and other reports with the SEC, that must comply 
with its general and special disclosure requirements. 
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It is well-accepted in the securities practice that material facts 
include not only "information disclosing the earnings and distribu-
tions of a company but also those facts which affect the probable 
future of the company .... 22 Thus, a publicly held corporation is 
required to disclose, for instance, legal proceedings instituted 
against it when there is a substantial likelihood that reasonable 
investors would attach importance to that information in making 
their investment decisions. 23 The general materiality standard may 
also mandate disclosure even where a claim has only been threatened 
against a corporation. 24 Furthermore, this standard of disclosure 
may be satisfied where a corporation has violated the law, and knows 
it is thereby subject to yet unasserted legal claims.25 In sum, when-
ever a reasonable investor, in deciding whether to buy or sell a 
company's securities, would want to know about the corporation's 
exposure to potential liability, these general materiality principles 
will trigger the corporation's duty to disclose. 26 
Although the materiality standard would apply by implication to 
legal claims arising under environmental laws, the SEC issued a 
release in 1971 expressly stating this application. 27 The release pro-
vided that "the Commission's disclosure requirements relating to 
legal proceedings call for disclosure, where material, of proceedings 
arising ... [under] statutes, federal, state or local, regulating the 
discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise specifically 
relating to the protection of the environment."28 
22 Texas Gulf, 401 F.2d at 849. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 753 (1975) ("[t]he SEC ... requires prominent emphasis be given in filed registration 
statements and prospectuses to material adverse contingencies"). 
23 See generally Dennis and Keith, Are Litigation Disclosures Adequate?, 151 J. ACCTANCY. 
54 (1981). 
24 This mandate would exist assuming that the reasonable investor would be substantially 
likely to attach importance to the particular threat of legal proceedings against a corporation 
in determining whether to buy or sell its securities. 
25 See, e.g., Grossman v. Waste Management Inc., New Ct. Decisions [1983-1984 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,548 at 97,148 (Oct. 26, 1983). After Judge Marshall 
denied the defendant's motion to stay, the defendant moved for summary judgment. Judge 
Marshall's decision on this matter is reported in 589 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
26 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1986). 
27 Disclosures Pertaining to Matters Involving the Environment and Civil Rights, Securities 
Act Release No. 5170, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 78,150 (July 
19, 1971). 
28 [d. at 80,488. The Release also states that the SEC requires disclosure, if material, "when 
compliance with statutory requirements with respect to environmental quality e.g., various 
air, water and other anti-pollution laws, may necessitate significant capital outlays, may 
materially affect the earning power of the business, or cause material changes in registrant's 
business done or intended to be done." [d. at 80,487-80,488. Because this Comment focuses 
1987] SEC DISCLOSURE 733 
The 1971 release indicates that the SEC's environmental disclo-
sure requirements regarding corporate liability originally coincided 
with most of the SEC's other regulations mandating disclosure of 
material information relating to the business operations and financial 
condition of publicly held corporations. 29 Although the Commission 
later adopted specific environmental disclosure regulations, disclo-
sure obligations under general materiality principles continue to 
apply to legal proceedings arising under environmental laws. 30 As 
the Commission has explained, its general reporting rules "require 
disclosure of any additional material information, beyond that for 
which disclosure is required by specific Commission rule, necessary 
to make required statements not misleading."31 This requirement 
becomes particularly apparent when dealing with the issue of unas-
serted legal claims. 32 
A. The NEPA Mandate 
A question might legitimately be raised as to why the SEC issued 
the 1971 release if the release primarily articulated what was already 
apparent under the SEC's general reporting rules. 33 It seems likely 
that the release was prompted at least in part by Congress' then-
recent enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA).34 
Among other things, NEP A instituted the mandate that all federal 
agencies in their rulemaking activities must consider the protection 
of the environment. 35 All federal agencies would be required to 
"identify and develop methods and procedures . . . which will ensure 
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may 
be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with 
economic and technical considerations .... "36 Furthermore, § 102(1) 
of NEP A directs that "to the fullest extent possible ... the policies, 
regulations, and public laws of the United States should be inter-
on disclosable legal proceedings, pending, known to be contemplated, and unasserted, the 
issue of disclosable compliance costs raised by this provision is discussed herein only inciden-
tally. 
29 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-109-2-110. 
30 See In the Matter of U.S. Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,223, [1979-1980 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,319 at 82,382 (Sept. 27, 1979). 
31 Release No. 16,950, supra note 7, at 83,356. 
32 See infra notes 200-275 and accompanying text. 
33 See Release No. 5170, supra note 27, at 80,487-80,488. 
34 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
35 See id. at § 4332. 
36 I d. at § 4332(2)(B). 
734 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:729 
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in 
[NEPA] .... "37 In issuing the 1971 release, the SEC, then, possibly 
sought to reiterate registrants' disclosure obligations regarding po-
tential liability for environmental damage in order to exhibit its 
compliance with NEPA. 
B. The NRDC v. SEC Controversy 
Another factor that may have prompted the SEC to address en-
vironmental matters in the 1971 release was a petition filed by the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).38 The NRDC is a non-
profit organization, comprised of lawyers, scientists, and other pri-
vate citizens, that seeks protection of the country's natural re-
sources. 39 Not long before the SEC issued the 1971 release,4o the 
NRDC filed a rulemaking petition requesting the SEC to adopt 
certain detailed environmental disclosure rules. 41 This petition 
marked the beginning of the NRDC's exertion of pressure on the 
Commission to adopt comprehensive environmental disclosure 
rules. 42 This pressure continued throughout the 1970's. 43 
The purpose of the NRDC's 1981 petition was "to request that the 
Commission implement its new environmental mandate under NEP A 
in the corporate disclosure area. "44 The NRDC took the position that 
NEPA required the SEC to promulgate comprehensive disclosure 
rules that would bring to light the "environmental impact" of cor-
porate registrants. 45 The petition contained proposals for specific 
rules that would help achieve this result. 46 
37 [d. at § 4332(1). 
38 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 389 F. 
Supp. 689, 694 (D. D.C. 1974). 
39 [d. at 693. 
40 The SEC's release was issued on July 19, 1971. Release No. 5170, supra note 27, at 
80,487. The NRDC filed its petition with the SEC on June 1, 1971. See NRDC v. SEC, 389 
F. Supp. at 694. 
41 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 694. 
42 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 606 F.2d 
1031, 1035--39 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for a description of the history of NRDC-SEC relations. 
43 [d. 
44 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 694. 
45 [d. 
46 [d. The NRDC's petition proposed: 
that companies which file with the SEC be required to describe with respect to each 
major activity or product, inter alia: (l)the nature and extent (quantified to the 
extent feasible) of the resulting pollution or injury to natural areas and resources, 
and (2)the feasibility of, and plans for, correcting the same. The petition also re-
quested that the SEC require disclosure of whether the registered company has 
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The environmental disclosure requirements mentioned in the 
SEC's 1971 release,47 emerging from the traditional materiality 
threshold,48 were a far cry from the NRDC's comprehensive disclo-
sure proposals. 49 A few months after the SEC issued the release, 
the Commission formally denied the NRDC's petition. 50 The letter 
denying the petition indicated that the Commission was in the pro-
cess of reviewing the environmental disclosures that had resulted 
from the 1971 release. 51 The Commission further expressed that it 
would "actively consider amendments" to its rules in the near fu-
ture. 52 Thus, although the SEC denied the NRDC's petition, it left 
open the possibility that other environmental disclosure rules might 
be proposed soon. 53 
In 1972, the year after the SEC denied the NRDC's petition, the 
SEC announced its proposals for special disclosure rules regarding 
environmental matters. 54 The SEC intended these new requirements 
to supplement, not replace, the existing obligations in this area. 55 
The special rules were adopted with some variations one year later, 
in 1973, after the Commission considered public comments concern-
ing the rule proposals. 56 
changed company products, projects, production methods, policies, investments or 
advertising to advance environmental values. 
Id. This kind of comprehensive environmental disclosure in public filings, and its use in 
compelling compliance with environmental laws is the topic of discussion in Pitt and Sonde, 
Utilizing the Federal Securities Laws to "Clean the Air! Clear the Sky! Wash the Wind!", 
16 How. L.J. 831 (1971). The authors state, for example, 
We do suggest, however, that the Commission can, and should, require corporate 
entities to disclose what they are doing to the environment and whether or not they 
are in compliance with legally imposed environmental standards. Such disclosure 
could thus be used as an additional weapon in the federal arsenal directed at envi-
ronmental problems .... 
Id. at 849-50. 
47 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra note 20. 
49 See supra note 46. 
50 See Release No. 5704, supra note 8, at 86,293, n.8, citing SEC File No. 4-179. 
51Id. at 86,293. 
52Id. 
63 Id. 
54 Proposed Amendments, Securities Act Release No. 5235, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 78,524 (Feb. 16, 1972). 
55 See Release No. 16,223, supra note 30. 
56 Notice of Adoption of Amendments, Securities Act Release No. 5386, [1973-1974 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 79,342 (April 20, 1973). One notable variation between 
the proposals and the amendments as adopted involved the treatment of environmentally-
related administrative or judicial proceedings by governmental authorities. Under the pro-
posals, all such proceedings would have to be discussed in detail, whereas under the final 
amendments registrants would be allowed to group similar proceedings and provide generic 
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Under these 1973 regulations, the SEC required publicly held 
corporations to disclose all environmental administrative or judicial 
proceedings instituted by governmental authorities, regardless of 
whether the proceedings were "material" to a company's business. 57 
Consequently, multibillion-dollar corporations, under no obligation 
to disclose non-environmental litigation potentially involving 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, were obliged to disclose govern-
mental proceedings for environmental damage involving only 
hundreds of dollars. 58 
The new regulations provided, however, that detailed disclosure 
of each of these governmental enforcement proceedings was unnec-
essary: 
Instead, issuers may set forth groupings of similar proceedings 
specifying the number of such proceedings in each group, giving 
generic descriptions thereof, stating the issues generally in-
volved, and if such proceedings in the aggregate are material to 
the business or financial condition of the issuer, describing the 
effect of such proceedings on the issuer. 59 
In spite of this option for providing generic descriptions whenever 
similar proceedings were involved, registrants would have to de-
scribe similar proceedings individually where any single proceeding 
involved a claim for damages in excess of ten percent of the issuer's 
current assets on a consolidated basis,60 or where any proceeding 
otherwise may have been material. 61 
The 1973 rules also eliminated a prior loophole in the SEC's liti-
gation disclosure requirements, as applied to litigation arising under 
environmental laws. 62 General instructions in the securities regula-
tions for assessing which legal proceedings publicly held companies 
must disclose provide that even though a legal proceeding involves 
damages in an amount meeting the standard for economic material-
ity, information need not be given if the proceeding is considered 
descriptions thereof. This option would be unavailable, however, whenever anyone proceeding 
would itself be deemed "material." 
57Id. at 83,030-83,031. In Air-Products and Chemicals, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 79,429 at 83,229 (June 11, 1973), the SEC 
rendered its opinion that the disclosure of these governmental proceedings is intended to be 
limited to those instituted by governmental entities within the United States. To the extent 
any foreign environmental provisions may have a material impact upon the company's financial 
condition or business, however, such matters should be disclosed. 
58 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-110. 
59 Release No. 5386, supra note 56, at 83,030-83,031. 
60 Id. at 83,031. 
61Id. 
62 Id. at 83,030. 
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"ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business."63 On the other 
hand, the 1973 regulations stated that "administrative or judicial 
proceedings arising under any Federal, State or local provision reg-
ulating the discharge of material~ into the environment"64 could no 
longer be considered "ordinary routine litigation. "65 Thus, the SEC 
closed the loophole as it related to environmental litigation. 66 
Along with the special 1973 environmental disclosure rules, the 
SEC also adopted an amendment to its general litigation disclosure 
rules. 67 The amendment would require a description of the factual 
basis of all material legal proceedings.68 This requirement would 
apply to both environmental and non-environmental pending litiga-
tion and litigation "known to be contemplated by governmental au-
thorities. "69 In addition to requiring a description of the factual basis 
of the proceeding, the SEC would also require registrants to disclose 
the relief sought therein. 70 
Although it adopted special environmental disclosure rules to sup-
plement general materiality principles in this area, the SEC declined 
to adopt the rules advocated by the NRDC.71 As a challenge to the 
Commission's failure to propose the full disclosure rules it sought, 
the NRDC instituted an action in federal district court shortly before 
the 1973 rules were adopted. 72 The NRDC challenged the SEC's 
proposed rules (alleging the rules were inadequate under NEPA),73 
and attacked the denial of the NRDC's rule making petition (on the 
grounds of procedural unsoundness).74 The district court was per-
suaded by the NRDC's position, and held that the SEC's proceedings 
failed to satisfy the Administrative Procedure AcF5 and NEP A.76 
63 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
64 Release No. 5386, supra note 56, at 83,030. 
65 Id. 
66 This special exception to the "ordinary routine litigation" out continues to exist in the 
SEC's current rules for environmental litigation disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
67Id. 
68 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
69Id. 
7°Id. 
71 See supra note 46. 
72 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 689. 
73 Release No. 5704, supra note 37, at 86,293. 
74Id. 
75 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1986). The court concluded that the Commission had "failed to 
comply with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in formulating 
and promulgating its new regulations in Release No. 5386 .... " NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 
at 693. 
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). The court explained: 
When the SEC reconsiders its rules in accordance with this opinion, it should develop 
a record and resolve two overriding factual issues. The first is the extent of "ethical 
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The court remanded the matter to the Commission, and ordered it 
"to undertake further rulemaking action to bring [its] corporate 
disclosure regulations into full compliance with the letter and spirit 
of NEP A. "77 
On remand, the SEC issued a release to provide notice of its 
renewed proceedings to fulfill the district court's instructions. 78 The 
release provided: 
[T]he Commission seeks to obtain the views of the public con-
cerning whether, and to what extent, information that does not 
necessarily have direct and immediate economic significance 
might nevertheless be the type of information that a reasonable 
investor would wish to have in making an investment decision 
or giving a proxy. 79 
After issuing the release, the SEC conducted public hearings for 
nineteen days.80 There was substantial public interest in these pro-
ceedings.81 The file generated by the proceedings is in excess of ten 
thousand pages, comprised of letters of comment, transcripts of 
testimony, and exhibits presented in the course of testimony. 82 After 
the proceedings, the Commission concluded that no showing had 
been made that it should require expansive disclosure of information 
about corporate environmental practices of all registrants. 83 Fur-
thermore, the Commission announced that it would not adopt the 
rules advocated by the NRDC, and correspondingly issued lengthy 
explanatory statements.84 
Following the SEC's rejection of the NRDC proposals, the parties 
cross-moved for summary judgment in the district court. 85 The court 
investor" interest in the type of information which plaintiffs have requested. The 
second issue is what avenues of action are available which ethical investors may 
pursue and which will tend to eliminate corporate practices that are inimical to the 
environment .... 
NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 701. 
77 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 693. 
78 Notice of Public Proceeding, Securities Act Release No. 5569, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,110 (Feb. 11, 1975). 
79Id. at 85,110. 
80 Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rule-Making Proposals, Securities Act Release 
No. 5627, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 80,310, at 85,709 (Oct. 14, 
1975). 
81Id. 
82 Id. 
&'lId. at 85,707. 
84 Id. at 85,706-85,728. See infra notes 102-105 and accompanying text. 
85 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 432 F. Supp. 
1190, 1194 (D. D.C. 1977). 
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granted the NRDC's motion, finding the Commission's action "ar-
bitrary and capricious, "86 and ordered the Commission to undertake 
further rulemaking in accordance with the court's opinion, to be 
completed within six months. 87 
The Commission appealed the district court's decision to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 88 That 
court reversed the lower court's opinion in Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Securities & Exchange Commission,89 thus sup-
porting the Commission's defiant position regarding the NRDC's 
disclosure proposals. 90 The court ruled that the SEC's determination 
not to require comprehensive environmental disclosure statements 
from corporate registrants, made on the basis of informed rulemak-
ing proceedings, was reasonable and satisfied the SEC's obligations 
under NEP A. 91 
One factor that persuaded the appellate court to rule in the SEC's 
favor was its belief that Congress had vested the Commission with 
broad discretionary powers to promulgate disclosure rules. 92 An-
other key factor in the court's decision was its interpretation that 
NEP A does not require the SEC to promulgate specific rules. 93 Also, 
the court determined that the SEC's rulemaking proceedings were 
bona fide and "in accordance with all canons of procedural fairness."94 
As a result of this favorable appellate court judgment, the SEC was 
allowed to rest with its relatively moderate environmental disclosure 
rules after years of being under fire by the NRDC to adopt its full 
disclosure proposals. 95 
By persistently and emphatically refusing to adopt the NRDC's 
broad proposals, the SEC had revealed its motive in promulgating 
the existing environmental disclosure regulations. The SEC intended 
foremost to promote informed investment decisions, rather than to 
regulate corporate conduct regarding environmental compliance. 96 
The Commission believed that although the Securities Act granted 
86 I d. at 1212. 
871d. At the time of this decision, the NRDC v. SEC proceeding had been ongoing for over 
four years. 
86 NRDC v. SEC, 606 F.2d at 1035. 
89 I d. at 1062. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1054-56. 
92 I d. at 1045. 
93 Id. 
94 I d. at 1056. 
95 See supra note 42. 
96 See Release No. 5627, supra note 80, at 85,713. 
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it broad discretion to require disclosure, its exercise of authority 
was limited to the objectives of the federal securities laws. 97 In one 
of its releases, the Commission explained: 
Specifically, insofar as it is relevant here, the Commission may 
require disclosure . . . if it believes that the information would 
be necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or 
the furtherance of fair orderly and informed securities markets 
or for fair opportunity for corporate suffrage. Although disclo-
sure requirements may have some indirect effect on corporate 
conduct, the Commission may not require disclosure solely for 
this purpose. 98 
Although the Commission had adopted limited disclosure regulations 
pursuant to NEPA, NEPA basically did not alter the disclosure 
scheme that the Commission believed was appropriate. 99 NEP A au-
thorized and required the Commission to consider the promotion of 
environmental protection, but "along with other considerations. "100 
When it reviewed its environmental disclosure rules under court 
mandate, the SEC had taken into account some of those "other 
considerations. "101 For instance, the Commission considered the 
basic decision of Congress that, as far as investing is concerned, the 
primary interest of investors is economic. 102 To ensure that mean-
ingful and careful disclosure documents would be attained without 
unreasonable costs to registrants and their shareholders, the Com-
mission also kept in mind the cost-benefit implications of alternative 
proposals. 103 The Commission also included in its determinative bal-
ance the administrative burdens involved in the proposed disclo-
sure. 104 In the end, it concluded that the NRDC's proposals were 
adverse to these "other considerations" and, as a result, refused to 
adopt major changes in its relevant rules. 105 
97Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Release No. 5704, supra note 8, at 85,716. See Gage v. Atomic Energy Commission, 479 
F.2d 1214, 1220 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 115 Congo Rec. 40,926 (Dec. 22, 1969). 
100 Release No. 5627, supra note 80, at 85,716. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Com-
mittee v. Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
101Id. 
102Id. at ~ 85,721. The Commission explained: 
Id. 
After all, the principal, if not the only reason why people invest their money in 
securities is to obtain a return. A variety of other motives are probably present in 
the investment decisions of numerous investors but the only common thread is the 
hope for a satisfactory return, and it is to this that a disclosure scheme intended to 
be useful to all must be primarily addressed. 
103 I d. at 85,712-85,713. 
I04Id. at 85,717. 
105Id. 
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C. The 1981 Proposed Amendments 
In 1981, just over two years after receiving the favorable appellate 
court judgment, however, the SEC published for comment amend-
ments that would significantly alter its environmental disclosure 
rules. 106 Yet, instead of expanding disclosure requirements in this 
area, as the NRDC had hoped, the proposed amendments cut back 
on the disclosure requirements. 107 The relevant release was met with 
notable silence by the NRDC contingency. lOS The Commission ex-
plained that it was making the proposals subsequent to a review of 
environmental litigation disclosures generated by the existing pro-
visions, and after receipt of comments by the public. 109 
The most significant change contemplated by the proposals was to 
replace the disclosure requirement of all environmental proceedings 
involving a domestic governmental authority110 with a $100,000 
threshold. 111 Pursuant to the proposed amendments, registrants 
would be required to disclose governmental proceedings involving 
potential fines unless the registrant "reasonably believes such pro-
ceedings will result in fines ofless than $100,000."112 The Commission 
106 Proposed Amendments Regarding Disclosure of Certain Environmental Proceedings, 
Securities Act Release No. 6315, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 82,867 
(May 4, 1981). 
107 [d. at 84,288-84,291. 
108 Obviously, both sides had not forgotten that Judge McGowan's opinion paid substantial 
deference to the Commission's discretion in promulgating disclosure regulations. See NRDC 
v. SEC, 606 F.2d at 1035-62. 
109 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,287. Perhaps the SEC's proposals were also 
prompted to some extent by President Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,291, signed on 
February 17, 1981. The Order provides in part: "In promulgating new regulations, reviewing 
existing regulations, and developing legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies 
to the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following ... (b) Regulatory action shall 
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the 
potential costs to society[.]" 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431--34, 432 (1982). The SEC had earlier 
acknowledged its responsibilities to weigh with care the costs and benefits that result from 
its rules, and had decided the NRDC proposals failed this test. See Release No. 5627, supra 
note 80, at 85,717 and 85,727. 
110 In Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 79,429 (June 11, 1973), the Commission stated: 
While . . . nothing in the forms delineates as between domestic and foreign environ-
mental provisions, it is our view that to the extent any foreign provisions may have 
a material impact upon the company's financial condition or business that such matters 
should be disclosed. To the extent that certain provisions of the amendments render 
governmental proceedings "material" apart from any standard of economic materi-
ality, it is our interpretation that the disclosure of such governmental proceedings is 
intended to be limited to those instituted by governmental entities within the United 
States. [d. at 83,229 (emphasis added). 
111 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,287. 
112 [d. 
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justified this proposal by observing that, despite the provision for 
grouping descriptions on a generic basis,113 the disclosures of envi-
ronmental proceedings involving governmental authorities were 
often excessively lengthy and detailed, tending to obscure disclo-
sures of the more significant proceedings. 114 The $100,000 threshold 
would, the Commission argued, alleviate the problem of cumber-
some, relatively unimportant disclosures. 115 The threshold would 
thereby improve the effectiveness and readability of environmental 
litigation disclosures for investors and shareholders.116 The SEC 
believed that this result would promote the goals of NEP A.117 
It could be argued that in publishing these 1981 proposals, the 
Commission again indicated that its intent behind the special disclo-
sure regulations was to promote informed investment decisionmak-
ing, rather than the regulation of corporate conduct. 118 The amend-
ments' effect would be to lower a corporation's disclosure burden 
regarding environmental litigation, because corporations would no 
longer have to report a number of governmental proceedings in 
public filings.119 At the same time, disclosure documents would be-
come more useful to investors in assessing a registrant's exposure 
to contingent environmental liability.120 These amendments were 
later adopted by the SEC,121 incorporated into the body of relevant 
law, and continue to reflect the law in this area. 122 
III. CURRENT SEC DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONTINGENT ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
Regulation S-K is the repository for the uniform disclosure regu-
lations of documents filed by publicly held corporations with the SEC 
under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. l23 In-
113 See text accompanying notes 59-61. 
114 Release No. 6315,supra note 106, at 84,287. The Commission asserted its awareness of 
"numerous instances in which disclosures of more significant environmental proceedings have 
been obscured by lengthy disclosures of relatively inconsequential governmental proceedings, 
particularly proceedings which involve small fines or relatively small capital expenditures." 
I d. (footnote omitted). 
115 Id. 
116 I d. at 84,287 n.24. 
117 Id. 
118 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
121 Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383 (LEXIS, 
Fedsec library, Secrel file) (Mar. 3, 1982). 
122 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
123 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1986). 
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struction 5 to Item 103 of Regulation S-K reflects the adoption of 
the environmental disclosure amendments proposed in May of 
1981.124 The SEC adopted Instruction 5 in its current form in March, 
1983, as part of the expansion and reorganization of Regulation S-
K.125 
The SEC's other specific disclosure rule directly applicable to 
environmental matters appears in Item 101(a)(1)(xii) of the same 
Regulation. 126 Commentators consider this provision, which requires 
disclosure of the material effects that compliance with federal, state, 
and local environmental legislation may have on a corporation's cap-
ital expenditures, earnings, and competitive position, relatively non-
controversial. 127 This rule presents a related but separate issue from 
that of disclosable corporate contingent liability for environmental 
damage. 128 
In addition to examining reporting requirements in connection 
with Item 103, one must also examine general materiality 
principles129 to gain a thorough understanding of SEC disclosure 
obligations regarding corporate contingent environmental liability. 
The problem of the unasserted claim and its corresponding disclosure 
duty that shows up in this area is the primary focus of discussion in 
the next section. 130 
A. Instruction 5 to Item 103 of Regulation S-K 
Instruction 5 to Item 103 of Regulation S-K lists three thresholds 
for determining when a corporation must report an administrative 
or judicial proceeding131 "arising under any federal, state or local 
12417 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
125 Release No. 6383, supra note 121. 
126 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (1986). 
127 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-111. 
128 See supra note 28. 
129 See supra note 20. 
130 See infra notes 201-275 and accompanying text. 
131 In Release No. 6383, the Commission stated that registrants should consult Securities 
Act Release No. 6130 for guidance regarding the scope of the definition of "proceeding." That 
release sets forth a broad reading of the term: "The meaning of an administrative proceeding 
for the purposes of this rule has never been construed narrowly by the Commission." It 
provides, furthermore, that Notices of Violation issued by the EPA are covered by the term, 
as well as administrative orders relating to environmental matters, whether or not those 
orders literally follow a "proceeding." The release also provides that the Commission interprets 
its rule to require disclosure of administrative proceedings which are initiated by the regis-
trant, as well as those initiated by the government. Of course, one of the thresholds must be 
met to trigger the duty, or "materiality" under the general disclosure rules. Release No. 6130, 
supra note 7. 
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prOVISIons that have been enacted or adopted regulating the dis-
charge of materials into the environment or primary [sic] for the 
purpose of protecting the environment .... "132 The three thresholds 
are: the general materiality test,133 the ten percent of current assets 
test,134 and the $100,000 test. 135 If an environmental proceeding sat-
isfies anyone or more of the tests, the disclosure duty is triggered. 136 
In this event, the corporate registrant must provide complete infor-
mation about the particular proceeding(s), including the name of the 
court or agency in which the proceeding is pending, the date insti-
tuted, the principal parties involved, a description of the factual 
basis alleged, and the relief sought. 137 Registrants must report sim-
ilar information for any such proceedings "known to be contemplated 
by" governmental authorities. 138 
The first disclosure threshold states a general materiality test: any 
pending legal proceeding (and proceedings known to be contemplated 
by governmental authorities) must be disclosed if "material to the 
business or financial condition of the registrant. "139 As mentioned 
earlier, the term "material" limits the information required to those 
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would attach importance in determining whether to buy or 
sell the registered securities. 140 The SEC, then, expects corporate 
management and counsel to wear the robe of the reasonable investor 
in assessing the economic significance of environmental litigation 
facing a corporation. 
The second threshold located in Instruction 5 is the ten percent of 
current assets test.141 Clause (b) requires disclosure of damage ac-
tions or governmental proceedings in which the total of "potential 
monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred charges or 
132 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). Before the adoption of the 1983 amendments, several com-
mentators had argued that "the increasing number of legislative and regulatory provisions 
which arguably relate to environmental matters" made it difficult to determine whether 
disclosure was required because the Instruction referred to proceedings arising under provi-
sions "otherwise relating to the protection of the environment." Release No. 6383, supra note 
121. To eliminate any ambiguity in this language, the Commission substituted the phrase "or 
primarily for the purpose of protecting the environment" as part of the 1983 amendments. [d. 
133 [d. at clause (a) of Instruction 5. 
134 [d. at clause (b) of Instruction 5. 
135 [d. at clause (c) of Instruction 5. 
136 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,288. 
137 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
138 [d. 
139 [d. at clause (a). 
140 17 C. F. R. § 240. 12b-2 (1986). 
141 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), clause (b) of Instruction 5. 
1987] SEC DISCLOSURE 745 
charges to income and the amount involved, exclusive of interest 
and costs, exceeds 10% of the current assets of the registrant and 
its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis .... "142 The SEC also em-
ploys this economic materiality test under Item 103 for non-environ-
mental legal proceedings. 143 Regarding Instruction 5, however, it is 
significant that federal statutes authorize unusually high fines and 
remedial costs in environmental enforcement actions. 144 An environ-
mental enforcement proceeding, then, is generally more likely to 
trigger this economic materiality standard than is a non-environ-
mental proceeding. For instance, a Superfund action against a cor-
poration could easily imply potential response and clean-up costs 
exceeding ten percent of the company's consolidated assets, espe-
cially considering judicial receptiveness to the imposition of joint and 
several liability under CERCLA.145 
An important feature of these two threshold tests is that regis-
trants must aggregate proceedings that present, in large degree, 
the same factual and legal issues. 146 Hence, assuming that govern-
mental and private enforcement proceedings were instituted against 
a corporation based on similar environmental damage allegations, 
the corporation would have to consider these proceedings together 
for disclosure consequences under the first two tests. 147 In other 
words, whether the threshold is met is determined by reference to 
the alleged conduct giving rise to the multiple proceedings, rather 
than to any single proceeding. This aggregation requirement has the 
effect of lowering the disclosure threshold regarding single proceed-
ings, because a corporation may have to disclose proceedings that 
do not individually meet either of the two thresholds. 148 
The third threshold in Instruction 5 applies only to governmental 
proceedings. 149 It states that corporations must disclose governmen-
tal proceedings involving potential monetary sanctions "unless the 
registrant reasonably believes that such proceeding will result in no 
142Id. 
143 Id. at Instruction 2. 
144 See supra note 15. 
145 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (a moderate approach to joint and several liability 
under CERCLA is persuasive and consistent with the intent of Congress); United States v. 
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (CERCLA permits, but does not require, the 
imposition of joint and several liability). 
146 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), Instruction 2. 
147 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,288 n.25. 
148Id. 
149 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), clause (c) of Instruction 5. 
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monetary sanctions, or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest 
and costs, of less than $100,000 .... "150 This provision does not 
require aggregation of similar proceedings. 151 
Once the third threshold is met, proceedings that are similar in 
nature may be grouped and described generically.152 The SEC re-
ports that its earlier proposal to delete this generic description pro-
vision was met with "extensive adverse reaction,"153 presumably by 
registrants. The SEC has retained this option because it believes 
that generic descriptions reduce registrants' disclosure burden, and 
often result in more intelligible disclosure documents for the benefit 
of shareholders and investors. 154 
Due to the inclusion of a "reasonable belief" standard, this third 
threshold test does not automatically require disclosure of any pro-
ceeding in which the possible maximum fine is $100,000 or more. 155 
Rather, this threshold allows companies "to consider both the 
amount of any potential fine and the probability that this maximum 
penalty, as opposed to a lesser fine, actually will be imposed."156 The 
150 [d. The Hl81 proposed amendments to the environmental disclosure rules referred to 
governmental proceedings involving potential "fines." Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 
84,288. The amendments as adopted, however, refer to governmental proceedings involving 
potential "monetary sanctions." Release No. 6383, supra note 121. The Commission makes no 
mention in the latter release to explain the different choice of words. In the 1981 release, the 
Commission does explain why it is distinguishing between governmental proceedings involving 
potential fines and other governmental proceedings: 
The Commission believes that disclosure of fines by governmental authorities may 
be of particular importance in assessing a registrant's environmental compliance 
problems. Proceedings involving fines (as opposed, for example, to proceedings in-
volving capital expenditures necessary to obtain regulatory permits) may be more 
indicative of possible illegality and conduct contrary to public policy. Accordingly, 
the Commission does not view a disclosure threshold related solely to a percentage 
of assets as appropriate in this context. 
Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,289. 
151 Release No. 6383, supra note 121. The Commission explained: 
[d. 
Several commentators believed that a burdensome data collection and evaluation 
effort would be required in order to determine whether the potential fines likely to 
be imposed in similar proceedings would meet the $100,000 threshold of clause (c). 
In response to this concern, the definition of 'proceeding' is revised to clarify that 
aggregation of similar proceedings is not required for purposes of clause (c). 
152 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), clause (c). "Generic" descriptions are when a registrant is 
allowed to provide groupings of similar proceedings, stating the issues generally involved, 
and providing a description of each group of proceedings, rather than each proceeding indi-
vidually. 
153 Release No. 6383, supra note 121. 
154 [d. 
155 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,288. 
156 [d. 
1987] SEC DISCLOSURE 747 
Commission has warned, however, that if a corporation fails to dis-
close a proceeding on the grounds of reasonable belief as to the 
improbability of a minimum $100,000 sanction being imposed, the 
registrant's reasonable belief must exist at the time the public filing 
is made. 157 Further, the registrant must re-evaluate its reasonable 
belief in connection with future filings if there is a change in circum-
stances. 158 
In forming a reasonable belief as to the financial outcome of a 
particular governmental proceeding, companies may want to con-
sider their prior dealings with governmental authorities, and also 
the outcomes of governmental proceedings involving similar allega-
tions brought against other companies. 159 This is especially true 
given that a good faith judgment, if deemed unreasonable by the 
SEC, would not provide the registrant with a defense to a disclosure 
violation under this test. 160 
The $100,000 threshold is probably the most controversial of the 
special environmental disclosure rules. 161 It is controversial because 
it departs somewhat from the economic materiality standard. 162 Cor-
respondingly, it is also the provision in Instruction 5 that diverges 
the most from the disclosure instructions for non-environmental legal 
proceedings.163 This divergence is a result of the test's origins. The 
clause (c) provision is all that remains of the 1973 amendment to the 
litigation disclosure rules that required disclosure of all governmen-
tal proceedings against a company for environmental damage. 164 The 
SEC had adopted that amendment to its rules when under fire by 
the NRDC to institute full environmental disclosure requirements. 165 
As a result of its deviation from the economic materiality standard 
and the other litigation disclosure rules, this third provision appears 
to be pro-environmental. 166 Whether the SEC has maintained this 
1571d. 
158 ld. 
159 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-114. 
160 A good faith, but unreasonable, judgment would not constitute a defense for the regis-
trant because the applicable standard of reasonableness is of course an objective one--would 
the reasonable registrant believe the threshold would not be met in that instance? The test is 
also a subjective one to the extent that the registrant must actually believe that the $100,000 
threshold will not be met. 
161 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), clause (c) 
162 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-114. 
163 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
164 See Release No. 5386, supra note 56, at 83,030. 
165 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
166 Hamilton comments: "This provision in some respects appears to be directed more toward 
requiring a public disclosure of possible environmental sins than at providing information 
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rule out of a sense of obligation under NEP A, or to avoid any further 
litigation with the NRDC or other public interest ~oups,167 is un-
clear. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Commission intends to enforce 
this rule, as well as the other disclosure requirements for contingent 
environmental liability,l68 and plans to construe these special rules 
"broadly and liberally. "169 
Noncompliance with the environmental disclosure requirements 
by corporations may result in enforcement action by the Commis-
sion,170 as well as private claims under the federal securities laws, 
such as section 11 of the Securities Actl7l or Rule 10b-5.172 The 
Commission has explained: 
In appropriate cases, the Commission may commence an enforce-
ment action, and investors who believe they have been, or are 
being, injured by non-disclosure of specific information have ju-
dicial remedies available to them. As the Supreme Court has 
recognized, these remedies constitute a necessary supplement 
to the Commission's own enforcement activities. 173 
The SEC, therefore, expects registrants to familiarize themselves 
with the nuances of the environmental disclosure obligations and to 
comply with those obligations in completing their public filings. 
B. The SEC's Expectations for Disclosure of Contingent 
Environmental Liability 
The SEC has warned against certain types of reporting practice 
as constituting inadequate, and hence actionable, environmental dis-
closures. 174 One such practice is providing overly-general related 
information in lieu of disclosable facts and required estimates. 175 For 
relevant to investment or voting decisions." Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-114 (footnote 
omitted). 
1671d. 
168 Release No. 6130, supra note 7. 
1691d. 
170 See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission v. Allied Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. 
77-373 (D.D.C. filed March 4, 1977); U.S. Steel Corp., Release No. 16,223, supra note 30; 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., Release No. 16,950, supra note 7. 
171 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). For a general discussion of section 11 liability, see Nicholas, The 
Integrated Disclosure System and its Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Inves-
tors Be Protected?, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 7-17 (1983). 
17217 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1986). For a discussion of Rule 10b-5 liability in an analogous 
context, see Sponseller, Federal Securities Law and the Need to Disclose the Risk of Canceling 
Nuclear Plant, 114 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 62, 63-65 (1984). 
173 Release No. 5627, supra note 80, at 85,707. 
174 See infra notes 175-194 and accompanying text. 
175 See, e.g., Release No. 16,950, supra note 7, at 83,351. 
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example, in its 1980 enforcement action against Occidental Petro-
leum Corporation (Oxy) , the Commission found that Oxy had not 
specifically disclosed the amount, or described the nature or extent, 
of the potential liabilities of a subsidiary, arising from its discharge 
of substantial amounts of wastes.176 Oxy had disclosed in various 
documents filed with the SEC, including its Annual Report on form 
10-K for the period ending December 31, 1977, that: "[i]n light of 
the expansion of corporate liability in the environmental area in 
recent years ... , there can be no assurance that Occidental will 
not incur material liabilities in the future as a consequence of the 
impact of its operations upon the environment."l77 The SEC deemed 
this general disclosure insufficient under federal securities law. 178 
For this and other reasons, Oxy ultimately submitted an offer of 
settlement to the Commission. 179 
Similarly, in its 1979 action against United States Steel Corpora-
tion (U.S. Steel), the SEC found mere disclosure that "the govern-
ment seeks to compel new pollution control efforts"180 inadequate as 
a description of the relief sought in an environmental proceeding. 181 
The disclosure rules mandate specificity, then, as to the factual basis 
of material claims (and material potential claims) and the dollar 
amounts involved therein. 182 Thus, the hedging element afforded by 
vagueness or generalities regarding environmental litigation disclo-
sures in SEC filings may be attractive to companies, but may also 
expose them to liability for non-disclosure of material facts. 
Another related reporting practice that may constitute a violation 
of federal securities laws is attempting to minimize the importance 
176 [d. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. at 83,356. The Commission provided: "Under the circumstances involved, the Com-
mission believes Oxy should timely have disclosed these potential liabilities and reasonably 
ascertainable amounts of potential exposure and costs associated therewith and other facts in 
several of Oxy's filings with the Commission." [d. 
179 [d. at 83,356-83,357. The offer of settlement provided, in part, that: 1) Oxy would 
designate a director, satisfactory to the Commission, who would be responsible for preparing 
an environmental report which would recommend to Oxy's Board of Directors procedures to 
ensure future compliance with the federal securities laws; 2) the Commission may consult 
with the director and be provided access to documents received, used or generated in the 
preparation of the report; and 3) the director would use Oxy's recently elected senior envi-
ronmental official and an outside consulting firm to help develop and prepare information for 
the report. 
180 Release No. 16,223, supra note 30, at 82,384. 
181 [d. The Release states: "[T]he Commission's regulations contemplate that an estimate of 
the level of expenditures required to install the pollution control equipment sought by the 
governmental authority be provided if such expenditures are likely to be material." [d. 
182 See supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text. 
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of material information by placing it in an obscure location within 
the financial report. l83 The Commission has stated that "disclosure 
about significant proceedings should be readily identifiable, and 
should not be obscured by, or buried within, general discussions 
.... "184 Moreover, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,185 
the Supreme Court explained: "The SEC, in accord with the congres-
sional purposes, specifically requires prominent emphasis be given 
in filed registration statements and prospectuses to material adverse 
contingencies. "186 A company may be held liable under the "buried 
facts" doctrine where material facts are disclosed in a place that 
obscures their significance. 187 Therefore, not only must registrants 
report specific facts and estimates, they must also report them in a 
prominent location. 188 
In addition to satisfying these requirements respecting sufficient 
specificity and prominence of location, registrants are expected to 
emphasize timeliness in providing litigation disclosures. 189 The tim-
ing of disclosures can be crucial, especially when dealing with neg-
ative financial information. l90 A corporation's delay in reporting po-
tentialliability for environmental damage may constitute a violation 
of disclosure obligations comparable to a complete failure to disclose 
material information. 191 In an analogous situation, the Tenth Circuit 
in Financial Industrial Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas COrp.192 
stated: "It is equally obvious that an undue delay not in good faith, 
in revealing facts, can be deceptive, misleading, or a device to de-
fraud under Rule 10b-5."193 Furthermore, under section 11 of the 
183 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,287 n.24. 
184 Id. The Commission recommends that registrants "improve the effectiveness and read-
ability of their environmental disclosures by using separate paragraphs or headings to distin-
guish general environmental information, such as broad descriptions of various legal require-
ments and standards, from information relating to specific environmental proceedings." Id. 
185 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
186 Id. at 753 (citation omitted). 
187 Sponseller, supra note 181, at 64 (1984). See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian SS. Co., 
535 F.2d 761, 773-774 (3d Cir. 1976); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 
F. Supp. 544, 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
188 See id. 
189 See Fedders and Perry, Policing Financial Disclosure Fraud: The SEC's Top Priority, 
158 J. ACCTANCY. 58, 59 (1984). 
190 Block, Barton and Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information Con-
cerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1257 (1985). 
191 Both the special rules, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986), and the general materiality standard, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1986), anticipate that corporations will disclose information from the 
time it meets the relevant standard. 
192 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). 
193 Id. at 519. 
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Securities Act, the issuer might even be liable for a good faith delay, 
and the underwriter and accountant may be liable for being negligent 
as to the issuer's good faith delay. 194 The timeliness requirement also 
means that registrants must update their filings as circumstances 
change, so that the disclosed information continues to be an accurate 
account of the company's financial condition. 195 
Timely environmental litigation disclosures are more attainable 
where corporations have instituted audit programs to furnish man-
agement with reliable, up-to-date information about the company's 
environmental activities and problems. 196 Yet, the burden imposed 
by the SEC on corporations regarding the timing issue would, in 
certain circumstances, continue to be tremendous. 197 Under general 
materiality principles, the potential assertion of a claim may be 
disclosable even before the corporation has been threatened with 
any such claim. 198 That is, if a corporation violates the law, the 
possibility then exists that either governmental or private claims 
will be asserted against it. This possibility may make the violation 
and its financial implications material even before parties outside the 
company know of the violation. 199 
The issue of disclosure obligations respecting unasserted claims 
against a corporation for environmental damage is an important one 
that arises under general materiality principles. The SEC has made 
some attempt to explain what it expects of publicly held corporations 
in this area. So far, it appears that these expectations impose a 
substantial disclosure burden on corporate registrants. Part of this 
burden is the difficulty of figuring out exactly what standard a cor-
poration has to meet before the disclosure duty is triggered. Popular 
compliance with these requirements seems unlikely to occur, unless 
the SEC reduces the relevant disclosure duty, or at least clarifies it, 
for the benefit of both corporations and investors. 
IV. THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE UNASSERTED CLAIMS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
The SEC's special environmental disclosure rules apply to all pend-
ing legal proceedings and those "known to be contemplated" by 
194 See Nicholas, supra note 171, at 7. 
195 Release No. 6315, supra note 106, at 84,288. 
196 See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-117. 
197 See infra notes 248-256 and accompanying text. 
198 Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., New Ct. Decisions, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,548 at 97,148 (Oct. 26, 1983). 
199 [d. 
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governmental authorities. 20o Disclosure obligations as to potential, 
unasserted claims arise not under the special rules, but rather, under 
general materiality principles. 201 The SEC has again and again stated 
that compliance with the special environmental disclosure rules "does 
not necessarily constitute full compliance with the disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws. "202 Although the duty to disclose 
the possibility of material, unasserted claims arising under environ-
mental laws is not the subject of a special rule, it is still important. 
Indeed, this duty becomes crucial insofar as its relevance might get 
overlooked or underestimated in SEC filings. 203 
In addition to complying with the special disclosure rules promul-
gated by the SEC, a corporation's public filings must also satisfy 
general disclosure rules under the federal securities laws. 204 In a 
1980 release,205 the Commission explained: 
The Commission's general reporting rules require disclosure 
of any additional material information, beyond that for which 
disclosure is required by specific Commission rule, necessary to 
make required statements not misleading. In the context of its 
environmental releases, the Commission has interpreted these 
rules as requiring disclosure of all other environmental infor-
mation of which the average prudent investor might reasonably 
be informed. 206 
The perennial question that registrants must ask, then, regarding 
both environmental and non-environmental information, is: "Have 
we told investors all that is material and wearisome about the com-
pany's business and financial condition?"207 Attempting to answer 
200 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1986). 
201 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
202 Release No. 6130, supra note 7. See also Release No. 16,223, supra note 30, at 82,382; 
Release No. 16,950, supra note 7, at 83,356; Release No. 5704, supra note 41, at 86,297. 
203 Because Instruction 5 to Item 103 only deals with pending legal proceedings, and legal 
proceedings known to be contemplated by governmental authorities, the registrant might 
mistakenly draw the conclusion that there is no disclosure duty regarding unasserted claims 
for corporate environmental damage. That would be a dangerous conclusion, however, as the 
SEC has explained in relevant releases and enforcement proceedings brought under the 
general reporting rules. 
204 As mentioned earlier, supra note I, this combination of specific and general disclosure 
rules also applies where a company is completing a registration statement under the Securities 
Act, pursuant to section 5. 
205 Release No. 16,950, supra note 7. 
206 [d. at 83,356 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
207 See Securities Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1986). This rule 
provides: "In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement or 
report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, necessary to make the 
required statements made not misleading." [d. 
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this question cautiously might well be regarded as a greater chal-
lenge than complying with the numerous specific disclosure require-
ments that apply to ongoing public filings. Moreover, unasserted 
claim disclosure obligations in the environmental area represent part 
of that challenge, as evidenced by various SEC enforcement ac-
tions. 208 
A. Enforcement Actions 
The SEC's requirement that publicly held corporations report 
material unasserted legal claims was of primary importance in the 
SEC's 1977 enforcement action against Allied Chemical Corporation 
(Allied).209 In its complaint,210 the Commission charged that Allied 
was subject to material contingent liability due to its alleged dump-
ing of kepone into the James River in Virginia.211 The complaint 
read in part: 
Allied was exposed to material potential financial liabilities from 
companies, individuals and state and local governments to sig-
nificant amounts of kepone. Allied failed to disclose such potential 
material financial exposure in its reports to shareholders and the 
investing public in violation of the antifraud and reporting pro-
visions of the securities laws.212 
Without admitting or denying the SEC's charges, Allied consented 
to the entry of a permanent injunction. 213 The court enjoined Allied 
from violating the disclosure and reporting requirements of the fed-
eral securities laws. 214 Under the terms of the consent injunction, 
Allied also agreed "to maintain, review, modify and provide infor-
mation to the Commission with respect to its current policies, prac-
tices and procedures to apprise management of material environ-
mental risk areas and uncertainties in connection with its 
business. "215 
The Commission's emphasis in the Allied proceeding was not that 
claims had already been asserted or even threatened against the 
corporation at the time of the non-disclosure. The Commission's 
208 See infra notes 209-246 and accompanying text. 
209 Securities & Exchange Commission v. Allied Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. 77-373 
(D. D.C. filed March 4, 1977). 
210 Reported and excerpted in 393 SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-17 (BNA) (March 9, 1977). 
211 Id. 
212Id. 
213Id. at A-lB. 
214Id. at A-17. 
215Id. at A-lB. 
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position was, rather, that the company, during the period in ques-
tion, had allegedly violated environmental laws and knew that the 
implications of the violation might be serious. 216 The violation of 
environmental laws coupled with an awareness of its high risk factor 
apparently was enough to trigger the disclosure duty under the 
traditional materiality test.217 The implication, then, is that Allied 
was under an obligation to disclose the possibility of claims being 
asserted against it, even before outside parties became aware of its 
alleged dumping of pollutants. 218 
Another example of the potential for corporate liability based on 
unasserted claims occurred in 1979, involving U.S. Steel Corporation 
(U.S. Steel). In 1979, U.S. Steel consented to the entry of an order 
finding that the company had failed to make adequate disclosure of 
environmental matters in its ongoing reports filed under the Ex-
change Act.219 The Commission charged U. S. Steel with violations 
of the special environmental disclosure rules as well as general ma-
teriality principles. 220 Moreover, the Commission restated its warn-
ing that compliance with the specific environmental disclosure rules 
may constitute only partial compliance with the federal securities 
laws. 221 
The Commission determined, inter alia, that U. S. Steel breached 
general disclosure duties when it failed to report that its policy 
towards environmental compliance exposed the company to material 
contingent liability.222 The Commission explained that U. S. Steel 
"pursued an environmental policy of actively resisting environmental 
requirements which it maintained were unreasonable ... [t]hereby 
exposing itself to certain risks including the possibility of substantial 
civil and criminal penalties. "223 
Though the Commission does not require all companies to disclose 
their general environmental policy,224 a company would have related 
disclosure obligations in two situations. First, where a company 
voluntarily discloses certain information about its environmental 
216 [d. The Commission argued that the company "knew that animal and marine life that 
ingested kepone suffered adverse effects."[d. 
217 [d. 
218 [d. The Commission's complaint focused on Allied's knowledge of the alleged dumping 
and its potential hazard, not such knowledge by other parties. 
219 Release No. 16,223, supra note 30, at 82,386. 
220 [d. at 82,382-82,384. 
221 [d. at 82,382. 
222 [d. at 82,384. 
223 [d. at 82,380-82,381. 
224 [d. at 82,384. 
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compliance policy, that information cannot contain misleading state-
ments or omissions. 225 Second, if a company "has a policy or approach 
toward compliance with environmental regulations which is reason-
ably likely to result in substantial fines, penalties, or other significant 
effects on the corporation, it may be necessary for the registrant to 
disclose the likelihood and magnitude of such fines, penalties and 
other material effects .... "226 In the case of U. S. Steel, the envi-
ronmental regulations that were of principal importance227 were the 
Clean Air Act228 and the Clean Water Act. 229 
Based on this latter SEC interpretation of disclosure obligations 
under the federal securities laws, a corporation may have to report 
company policy resistant to environmental compliance, aside from 
actual environmental law violations. Thus, the U.S. Steel action adds 
to our understanding of disclosure duties respecting unasserted 
claims that such duties do not ripen merely upon incidents of non-
compliance with environmental laws or the assertion of legal claims 
against a registrant. Pursuing corporate policy resistant to compli-
ance with environmental laws may be enough to trigger disclosure 
obligations in this area. 230 
As part of its settlement with the Commission, U. S. Steel agreed 
to appoint a task force to review its prior environmental disclosures, 
and to submit a report to the audit committee of the company's board 
of directors, outlining procedures to provide for timely and complete 
disclosure in the future. 231 Here again, the Commission demon-
strated its determination that claims need not have been asserted 
against a company before their potential financial consequences must 
be disclosed. 
After the U.S. Steel action, we can picture an SEC mandatory 
disclosure continuum regarding contingent environmental liability 
beginning at the earliest stage with corporate policy resistant to 
environmental compliance. Next would be a corporation's environ-
mental law violations, whether or not outside parties are aware of 
225Id. 
226 Id. 
227Id. at 82,377. 
228 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). 
229 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
230 It is debatable, however, whether the SEC would attempt to enforce this obligation 
before a concrete violation has occurred. It might be the SEC's intention to enforce this 
obligation primarily as a means of extending back in time the period for which the corporation 
is liable for nondisclosure where actual violations are located, in addition to company policy 
resistant to compliance with environmental laws. 
231 Id. at 82,384-82,286. 
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them. Then would follow environmental proceedings "known to be 
contemplated" by governmental authorities, and finally, pending le-
gal claims instituted against a corporation (either by private parties 
or governmental authorities), arising under environmental laws. 
Another SEC enforcement proceeding that illustrates the scope 
of the mandatory disclosure continuum is In the Matter of Occidental 
Petroleum COrp.232 In 1980, the Commission accepted an offer of 
settlement from Oxy, after charging that company with failure to 
disclose matters involving environmental protection and compli-
ance. 233 The Commission found that Oxy had failed to disclose the 
extent of legal proceedings instituted against Hooker Chemical (a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Oxy), for illegally discharging materials 
into the environment, and the effects of compliance with environ-
mental regulations on its corporate earnings and expenditures.234 
Furthermore, Oxy had not disclosed certain potential liabilities re-
sulting from the leaching of wastes into the environment from var-
ious of its chemical disposal sites. 235 
The last finding amounted to a violation of the Commission's gen-
eral reporting rules, whereas the previous two violations constituted 
special environmental disclosure breaches. As in Allied Chemical, 
the Commission expressed its view that the corporation "should 
timely have disclosed" its exposure to substantial financial risk, in-
dependent of whether any claims had yet been asserted against it 
for environmental damage. 236 Under the general disclosure rules, 
therefore, the registrant cannot expect to wait until proceedings are 
pending, or even known to be contemplated, before that risk factor 
might have to be disclosed. The bare potentiality of the proceedings 
may itself be considered material,237 and a failure to disclose it may 
result in a violation of the federal securities laws. Whereas the U.S. 
Steel proceeding involved a violation of general reporting rules aris-
ing from a failure to disclose company policy, the Allied Chemical 
232 Release No. 16,950, supra note 7. 
233 Id. at 83,356. 
234 Id. at 83,348-83,353. 
235 Id. at 83,348. 
236Id. 
237Id. The release provided: "The Commission's general reporting rules require disclosure 
of any additional material information, beyond that for which disclosure is required by specific 
Commission rule, necessary to make required statements not misleading." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). The release further provided that the SEC has interpreted the general reporting rules 
as requiring disclosure of "all other environmental information of which the average prudent 
investor might reasonably be informed." Id. quoting Release No. 5170, supra note 27. 
~~-- - -------
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action involved a similar violation arising from a failure to disclose 
corporate conduct regarding noncompliance with environmental reg-
ulations. 
Similarly, a corporation's duty to include information in its public 
filings about potential, unasserted claims for environmental damage 
was a central issue in Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc. 238 The 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
explained that the plaintiff's Rule lOb-5 action based on the defen-
dant corporation's failure to disclose violations of environmental laws 
was not dependent on actual sanctions by environmental authori-
ties. 239 The court stated: "If Waste Management indeed violated the 
law, there existed the possibility that sanctions would be imposed. 
Such a possibility would make these violations material. "240 The court 
denied the defendant's motion to stay the securities action until the 
conclusion of the environmental proceedings.241 If Waste Manage-
ment had failed to disclose the violations,242 the court reasoned, then 
the securities violation would already have occurred, regardless of 
whether sanctions had yet been imposed on the company by envi-
ronmental authorities. 243 
The underlying theory of liability in Grossman was based on the 
plaintiff's assertion that the reasonable investor would have found 
it significant in making his investment decision that Waste Manage-
ment risked liability by violating environmental laws. 244 The expec-
tation, then, was that if Grossman were involved in material illegal 
238 New Ct. Decisions, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,548 (Oct. 
26, 1983). 
239 [d. at 97,148. 
240 [d. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The implication present was that the court would 
conduct its own inquiry as to whether Waste Management, Inc. actually violated environmen-
tal laws. The violations could not be considered material if they never occurred: "Only if 
Waste Management had in fact violated the law, would defendants be obligated to disclose 
the violations to investors." [d. at 97,148. The court clarified, however, that "any conclusion 
reached on the securities claims should not be binding on the environmental proceedings, even 
to the extent that such conclusion indirectly decides the environmental charges." [d. at 97,151. 
241 [d. at 97,152. Judge Marshall concluded: "To stay this action pending eight separate 
environmental proceedings with which this action cannot interfere would be to relegate 
enforcement of the securities laws to a back seat behind the environmental laws. This we 
decline to do." 
242 The court explained: "Although illegal dumping could have serious consequences including 
suspension of operations, substantial fines, and rejection of permits to handle wastes, defen-
dants, according to the complaint, failed to include information about Waste Management's 
illegal activities in various company documents." [d. at 97,147. 
243 [d. at 97,151-97,152. 
244 [d. 
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dumping, the company should have reported this fact from the start 
in its filings with the SEC.245 By doing so, its shareholders and other 
investors would have been better informed as to the comprehensive 
financial condition of the company. 246 
B. Problems With the Current Duty to Disclose Unasserted 
Claims for Environmental Damage 
The implications of this disclosure expectation present in Gross-
man and in the earlier actions mentioned247 result in a substantial 
burden for corporate registrants. Although the SEC's disclosure 
rules do not specifically require a corporation to turn itself in by 
reporting violations before they are otherwise discovered,248 the 
general materiality principles essentially do just that. That is, reg-
istrants must disclose environmental violations in a timely manner 
where they create material financial exposure, regardless of whether 
the violations in question have become known to outside parties. 249 
The practical effect of this requirement would be to make the cor-
poration "raise a red flag" for governmental authorities and private 
litigants regarding particular incidents of noncompliance. Further-
more, there is presently no stipulation that such corporate disclo-
sures cannot be used as direct evidence of environmental violations. 
Given the likely outcome attached to this requirement,250 it is not 
difficult to imagine why registrants have resisted complying with 
this obligation. 
If publicly held corporations are obliged to disclose environmental 
violations in SEC filings virtually from the time of their occurrence, 
then registrants may be denied the opportunity to address the en-
vironmental problem more directly and efficiently than would be 
possible after such disclosure. Early reporting of noncompliance to 
shareholders will most likely lead to complications in resolving the 
245 [d. 
246 See id. 
247 See supra notes 207-246 and accompanying text. 
248 Hamilton, supra note 1, at 2-114. 
249 In these related enforcement actions, the event that generally triggers disclosure obli-
gations is the material environmental violation itself, rather than knowledge of such corporate 
misconduct by outside parties or governmental authorities. See, e.g., Release No. 16,950, 
supra note 7, at 83,356. 
250 The likely outcome is that a corporation would be exposing itself to a spate of enforcement 
proceedings, both governmental and private, very early on, and possibly before it would have 
time to take sufficient remedial action on its own initiative. 
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disputes. For instance, such disclosure will invariably cause bad 
relations between corporate management and shareholders, adding 
to the difficulties of taking efficient remedial measures. Moreover, 
investors may be unduly dissuaded from giving a corporation serious 
consideration as an investment opportunity upon its report of these 
violations, possibly before the company has had sufficient time to 
propose an effective response to the problem. 251 
There is also the unattractive risk of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" 
attached to the expectation that corporations will disclose their en-
vironmental violations and their corresponding material financial ex-
posure. 252 If a corporation reports that it is subject to potential 
liability of an estimated dollar amount on yet unasserted claims, 
based on a particular violation, the company could be advertising 
these lucrative claims to the advantage of potential litigants. Once 
claims have been instituted, or at least threatened against a com-
pany,253 mandatory disclosure of contingent liability becomes more 
defensible. While no claims have yet been asserted,254 however, it is 
harder to justify requiring a corporation to report areas ripe for 
litigation. 255 This is particularly true regarding environmental mat-
ters, because the potential for liability is immense. 256 
The SEC's interpretation of the general materiality principles in 
the area of unasserted claims for environmental damage imposes, 
then, an ominous burden on publicly held corporations. The harsh-
ness of this disclosure obligation characterized the kind of full dis-
closure proposals that were the subject of the NRDC-SEC battle in 
the 1970's.257 At that time, the SEC emphasized that its primary 
objective was to make available useful information to investors, 
251 Detriment to the financial condition of a corporation is, by extension, harm incurred by 
its shareholders. Thus, overly burdensome SEC disclosure requirements may have adverse 
financial consequences for a corporation's shareholders. This potential cost must be weighed 
against the potential benefits of having such disclosure requirements in this area. 
252 See Block, Barton and Garfield, supra note 190, at 1259. 
253 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.103. Item 103 special instructions for preparing litigation 
disclosures expressly apply to pending litigation and litigation known to be contemplated by 
governmental authorities. 
254 See supra notes 201-205 and accompanying text. 
255 One possible adverse effect of this requirement is that companies may be faced with a 
greater number of spurious claims. Reporting specific conduct that has exposed the company 
to potential liability, so far unasserted, may cost the company increased legal fees in defending 
itself against spurious claims. 
256 See supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text. 
257 See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. 
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rather than to regulate corporate conduct in social areas.258 Accord-
ingly, it fought hard to resist the NRDC's proposals. 259 
In articulating and enforcing registrants' reporting obligations re-
garding environmentally related legal claims yet to be asserted, the 
SEC seems to have given up some ground to the NRDC contingency. 
Although we have moved into a new area (the general reporting 
rules instead of special environmental rules) the conflict again in-
volves highly burdensome disclosure requirements versus more mod-
erate and investor-oriented disclosures. 26O The current law here 
seems to favor the long-standing NRDC position in support of com-
prehensive disclosure rules. 261 
In Release No. 5704,262 issued in 1976, the SEC clarified its resis-
tance to the NRDC's full disclosure proposals: 
Many of the proposals which have been suggested seem to be 
premised upon the assumption that the Commission has the 
principal responsibility for substantive regulation of environ-
mental practices. The Commission cannot, itself, undertake to 
regulate corporate conduct which affects the environment. Con-
gress and the states have created government authorities spe-
cifically to perform this function. We must presume that these 
government authorities are responsibly performing their duties 
and our disclosure requirements are necessarily premised, in 
part, upon this assumption. 263 
It is helpful to keep this clarification in mind in determining what 
kind of disclosure requirements are appropriate to the SEC's func-
tion. As the Commission's statement implies, the regulation of cor-
porate conduct regarding environmental compliance is an important 
function, but it is more appropriate to other federal and state agen-
cies, than it is to the Commission. If the Commission's disclosure 
authority and responsibility under the federal securities laws is re-
lated to the dissemination of economically significant information 
about corporations,264 then the disclosure requirements should be 
designed primarily to serve that purpose. 
258 See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. 
259 See supra note 42. 
260 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
262 Release No. 57,044, supra note 8. 
263 [d. at 86,292. 
264 Release No. 5627, supra note 80, at 85,709-85,711. 
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C. The Ambiguity of the Disclosure Thresholdfor Unasserted 
Claims 
The duty to disclose material unasserted legal claims against a 
corporation for environmental damage places another significant bur-
den on corporations. The test for determining when the possibility 
of unasserted claims against a corporation is "material" is very un-
clear, and hence affords minimal predictability and uniformity. The 
test is ambiguous as to whether the relevant standard is a probability 
of the event occurring, or merely a reasonable likelihood standard. 
In Grossman, the court cited Securities & Exchange Commission 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur CO.265 to support the proposition that the 
possibility of an event occurring may be material. 266 The test ad-
vanced in Texas Gulf for determining whether a contingency is 
material is to balance "both the indicated probability that the event 
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the 
totality of the company activity."267 This and other relevant language 
in the Texas Gulf opinion268 suggests that registrants should apply 
a probability standard similar to that recommended by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 269 In F ASB No.5, disclosure of a loss 
contingency involving an unasserted claim is not required of com-
panies "unless it is considered probable that a claim will be asserted 
and there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome will be unfa-
vorable. "270 
There is some indication, however, that the appropriate test in-
volves applying not a probability standard, but rather a reasonable 
likelihood standard.271 In U.S. Steel, the SEC stated that a corpo-
ration's compliance policy may trigger the corporation's disclosure 
duty if it is "reasonably likely" to result in substantial fines, penal-
ties, or other significant effects on the corporation. 272 Similarly, in 
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Mize,273 the court applied a 
265 401 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1968). 
265 New Ct. Decisions, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 99,548 at 
97,148 (Oct. 26, 1983). 
267 401 F.2d at 849. 
268 [d. 
269 See Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB), Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No.5, Accounting for Contingencies, 11 10 (1975). 
270 [d. (emphasis added). 
271 See Release No. 16,223, supra note 30, at 82,384; Securities & Exchange Commission v. 
Mize, 615 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1980). 
272 Release No. 16,223, supra note 30, at 82,384. 
273 615 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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reasonable likelihood standard regarding disclosure of contingent 
events.274 This standard is notably less advantageous to registrants 
than the probability standard suggested by Texas Gulf, and is gen-
erally used by accountants to distinguish which asserted claims a 
corporation must disclose. 275 Because of the ambiguity in the appli-
cable legal standard, corporations may have difficulty in determining 
exactly what their disclosure duty is respecting unasserted claims. 276 
D. Recommendations for Change 
In light of the heavy burden it places on registrants in this area, 
the SEC should reconsider whether the benefits of unasserted claim 
disclosure justify the costs of such disclosure. The SEC has in the 
past acknowledged its responsibility to weigh with care the costs 
and benefits that result from its rules. 277 Moreover, President Rea-
gan's Executive Order No. 12,291 requires this type of analysis from 
federal agencies in reviewing their existing regulations. 278 
As the Commission reviews the environmental disclosure obliga-
tions it places on corporate registrants, it should consider lowering 
the burden associated with unasserted claims. 279 One way of accom-
plishing this would be to interpret the disclosure duty as being 
inapplicable to claims that have not at least been threatened against 
a corporation. 28O Another method of moderating the disclosure bur-
den here would be to limit the information that corporations must 
provide about material unasserted claims not to include specific facts 
about the violations in question.281 Furthermore, the Commission 
could stipulate that disclosure of environmental violations before 
claims are threatened or asserted against a company, would not be 
available to government authorities or private plaintiffs to serve as 
274 [d. at 1051. See also Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 
247, 251 (2d Cir. 1973) (a statement relating to a contingent event may be material provided 
there is a "reasonable likelihood" of its future occurrence). 
275 FASB No.5, supra note 269. 
276 See infra note 283. 
277 Release No. 5627, supra note 8, at 85,727. 
278 E.O. No. 12,291, supra note 109. 
279 The SEC's position regarding unasserted claims would become more defensible in that 
the "costs" to registrants would not be so high, in comparison to the questionable value such 
information has in the hands of investors. 
280 This interpretation would lessen the amount of guesswork registrants would face in 
predicting their potential financial exposure for environmental noncompliance. 
281 Such a limitation would curb the "open the floodgate of liability" problem that might 
result from the corporation's spelling out lucrative claims for the plaintiffs' bar. 
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direct evidence of the particular violations. 282 Along with decreasing 
the relevant disclosure burden, such a stipulation would make pop-
ular compliance with these disclosure requirements more realistic. 
The Commission should at least attempt to clarify exactly what 
standard applies in determining the materiality of these contingen-
cies so that like cases will be treated alike and registrants will know 
what their rights are. 283 The likely result of both easing and clarifying 
the disclosure burden as to unasserted claims is that more corpora-
tions would comply with the law, because the consequences of com-
pliance would become less ominous to them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Both special rules and general materiality principles under the 
federal securities laws give rise to disclosure obligations for contin-
gent environmental liability. This body of law developed in the early 
1970's as a response to the enactment of NEPA, and pressure ex-
erted on the SEC by the NRDC to adopt full disclosure rules in this 
area. Throughout the 1970's, the Commission expressed that its 
primary objective in promulgating environmental disclosure rules 
was to promote informed investment decisions, rather than to reg-
ulate corporate conduct in environmental affairs. The Commission 
also inaicated in various releases and enforcement actions its expec-
tation that environmental disclosures will provide specific facts and 
estimates, placed in a prominent location, for the sake of effective-
ness and readability. The Commission further emphasized timeliness 
of disclosures, to the extent that a corporation might be obliged to 
disclose environmental violations and their potential financial impli-
cations even before claims are asserted or threatened against a 
company. In adopting and enforcing this requirement under general 
materiality principles, the Commission may have lost sight of its 
duty to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of its rules. The 
resulting burden imposed on registrants is not only severe, but it is 
also ambiguous, and makes popular compliance with this rule very 
unlikely. As it reviews its current rules, the SEC should consider 
reformulating, at least for purposes of clarification, its relevant en-
vironmental disclosure laws. 
282 This stipulation would alleviate the self-incrimination problem to which registrants are 
presently exposed. 
283 Ambiguity in the law is unfair to parties because they are not put on sufficient notice as 
to exactly what behavior will expose them to liability. Furthermore, where ambiguity in the 
law exists, different judges will likely arrive at very different results in similar situations, 
thus making the law appear arbitrary. 
